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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, 
Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 900238 
Court of Appeals No. 890121-CA 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The Court of Appeals in the Amended Marshall opinion did not 
conclude that State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) overruled prior 
Utah case law and Schlosser did not overrule prior Utah decisions. 
2. The Court of Appeal's ruling that the Petitioner is precluded from raising 
the standing issue for the first time on appeal is supported by the controlling 
United State Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court's decisions. 
3. The decisions of other cases purportedly representing a majority view are 
not disposivitive of this case, nor controlling case law. 
4. The Court of Appeals did erroneously conclude that the trial court's 
findings on consent to search were insufficient. However, the Court of Appeals did 
not establish a clear and convincing standard of proof on the issue of consent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS AMENDED OPINION IN 
STATE V. MARSHALL DID NOT CONCLUDE THAT STATE V. 
SCHLOSSER OVERRULED PRIOR UTAH CASE LAW. 
The Petitioner, in its Petition for Certiorari, maintains that the Court of 
Appeals overruled prior Utah case law in ruling standing cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. (See, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8.) The Petitioner 
has misread the Opinion. Careful scrutiny of the language employed by the Court 
of Appeals in its application of Schlosser, and particularly the standing issue, 
verifies that Schlosser is the undisputed controlling rule of law on this issue. 
Petition is really asking this Court to overturn Schlosser. 
In discussing Schlosser in light of predecessor standing cases; to wit, State 
v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) and State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1986), the Court note: 
[i]n these earlier cases, it is sometimes unclear whether the Utah 
Supreme Court raised the issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or 
permitted the state to raise the issue of standing for the first time on 
appeal. We assume that Schlosser supersedes these earlier cases 
and thus do not follow them. (Emphasis added) 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) n. 6 at 51. 
The Petitioner asserts this language means the Court of Appeals overruled 
earlier case law on the important issue of standing. Neither Justice Stewart, in the 
majority opinion in Schlosser, nor Justice Howe, in his vigorous dissent, 
addressed the two cases cited by the Petitioner. Justice Billings, in the Amended 
Marshall Opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit "A", uses the word "supersedes". 
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A more definitive explanation of what the Court of Appeals did in the Amended 
Opinion is "distinguish" Schlosser from the earlier cases. As Justice Billings 
illustrated, it was "sometimes unclear", in the earlier cases, how the issue of 
standing arose. Additionally, standing was not a dispositive issue in those cases. 
From the Amended Opinion, it is clear that she viewed Schlosser as the clearest 
dispositive case on this issue. It is this clarity which created the difference in 
Schlosser as it does in the instant matter. 
A review of both State v. Constantino, supra, and State v. Iacono, 
supra, illustrates that, in neither case, was the standing issue found by the court 
to be dispositive. In State v. Constantino, supra, the motion to suppress was 
made at the beginning of the trial and denied. There was apparently no prior 
opportunity or necessity for either party to develop the issues in the lower court. 
The opinion does not indicate whether or not the defendant's expectation of 
privacy was raised for the first time on appeal. Similarly, in State v. Iacono, 
supra, the defendant conceded, by affirmative testimony offered at time of trial, 
that he did not have an expectation of privacy in the area searched. A like 
circumstance is found in State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1984), where, as 
in Iacono, the defendant conceded his expectation of privacy. 
Petitioner's assertions that these cases were wrongly overruled by Schlosser 
and the appellate court in the Amended Marshall Opinion are without merit. 
These are the types of cases which Justice Billings declared, not overruled, but 
distinguishable from Schlosser and Marshall. 
Additionally, in the course of the string citation which Petitioner employs 
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on page 10 of the Petition for Certiorari, Petitioner cites, among others: Society 
of Professional J ournalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 
1987), Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d 796 
(Utah 1986) and Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis Board of Health, 709 
P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985) as examples of the prior case law which this Court has 
purportedly overruled in the Amended Marshall Opinion. These are all civil 
cases. "Standing", in a civil context, is not the same type of standing in the 
Constitutional context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution or Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, 
those cases are not dispositive of the rule of law on Fourteenth Amendment 
"standing". Additionally, in civil cases where the standing of the plaintiff is in 
question, it is plaintiff's burden, in the lower court, to proceed and establish it. 
This is clearly not the burden in a criminal case, where it standing is, as noted by 
the court akin to an affirmative defense. 
The Petitioner's position is an erroneous one, in that Schlosser has not 
overruled existing case law, but is, rather, the first case of this Court which clearly 
outlines the rule of law on this issue. The Court of Appeal's logic and ruling on 
raising standing for the first time on appeal is appropriate and a Writ of Certiorari 
should not be granted for review of the opinion. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S RULING THAT THE APPELLEE IS 
PRECLUDED FROM RAISING THE STANDING ISSUE FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
CONTROLLING UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND 
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 
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The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132 (Utah 
1989) to find that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This 
premise is thoroughly grounded in case law. As vigorously argued by Respondent 
before the appellate court, there are a number of both legal and equitable reasons 
why a defendant should not be forced to respond to issues on the appellate level 
which were not raised below. As stated by this Court in the Marshall opinion: 
[w]e believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashioned to protect the 
defendant from being required to deal with new legal issues on appeal 
when he had no warning of the necessity to develop the relevant facts 
below. 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) at 49. 
This position is supported in the United States Supreme Court Steagald v. 
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). In that case, as cited at page 48 of the 
Amended Marshall Opinion, the United States Supreme Court refused to allow 
the government to raise the issue of Fourth Amendment standing for the first time 
on appeal to enable it to provide an alternative ground to sustain the trial court's 
refusal to grant a motion to suppress. The Court is also directed to a line of cases 
which support the proposition that new issues cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal by either party. Mascar v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987), Lane v. 
Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986), Bundy v. Century Equipment, Inc., 692 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984), and Traynor v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). 
Similarly, in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), the United States 
Supreme Court declared that if the issue of standing is not raised, then it is 
deemed to be waived. 
By taking the above-stated position, the Petitioner is asking this Court to 
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establish a double standard between plaintiffs and defendants in search and 
seizure cases. The standard which the Petitioner urges this Court to adopt would 
allow the plaintiff Government, in this genre of cases, to raise new issues for the 
first time on appeal, while denying that right to the defendant. Such a standard 
would surely be in violation of the equal protection of the due process provisions 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1 Section 4 and Article 1 Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. This 
is not the type of law which this Court should consider making. 
The Court of Appeals' ruling that the Petitioner cannot raise new issues for 
the first time on appeal was correct. The United States Supreme Court cases and 
State v. Schlosser, are controlling. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEAL'S INTERPRETATION OF 
STANDING REQUIREMENTS WAS CORRECT. 
As argued hereinabove the other Utah cases relied upon by Petitioner are 
not dispositive. The Federal cases and cases from other jurisdictions the 
Petitioner claims represent the majority rule are not controlling. This Court 
should therefore affirm the decision on this issue and deny the Petition. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ON CONSENT TO 
SEARCH WERE INSUFFICIENT. HOWEVER THE COURT OF 
APPEALS DID NOT ESTABLISH A NEW CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING STANDARD OF PROOF ON THE ISSUE OF 
CONSENT. 
The Respondent agrees with the Petitioner on the limited issue that the trial 
court's findings were sufficient for appellate review in this matter. {See Petition 
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for Writ of Certiorari at 18). The record establishes the court's original findings 
were erroneous. The Respondent's Cross-Petition, which lays out the sufficiency 
argument and its rationale, is clear on this subject. The Court should and can 
examine this issue based only on the Cross-Petition. 
However, the Petitioner further asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by 
creating a clear and convincing standard for proof of consent. (See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 19). The opinion reveals that no new standard was created 
and Petitioner misread the language therein. Citing United States v. Abbott, 
546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977) the Court ruled: 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), the 
Tenth Circuit outlined the specifics necessary for the government to 
sustain its burden to show that voluntary consent was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the 
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and 
intelligently given"; (2) the government must prove 
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or 
implied; and (3) the courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing 
evidence that such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885. (quoting Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10 
Cir. 1962)). See also United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 
1453 (10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
State v. Marshall, 132 Utah Adv. Rptr. 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) at 49. 
This language does not purport to create a clear and convincing standard by which 
the evidence must be measured. It only outlines that any consent given must 
clearly be voluntary. 
The record in the lower court clearly establishes the State failed to prove 
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any consent to search the trunk or bags applying the applicable case law, even by 
a preponderance. Based thereon, there is no legal reason to review the issue of 
consent through Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari. A finding that consent was 
not established can be made by granting Cross-Petitioner's Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision on raising the issue of standing at the 
appellate level was correct and does not require review. Applicable case law from 
the United States Supreme Court and from this jurisdiction establishes that the 
standing rule applied by the appellate court was in compliance with controlling 
case law. The record establishes that consent has not been proven by any legal 
standard. The Petition for Certiorari should therefore be denied and this Court 
should limit its review to a determination of the issues set forth in the 
Respondent's Cross-Petition. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ f r d a y of June, 1990. 
MOONEY & ASSOCIATES 
JEriROLDvD. McPHEE KRISTINE K. SMITH 
Attorney for Respondent Attorney for Respondent 
236 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 364-5635 
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EXHIBIT "A 
There was no agreement by the Joan Cingo-
lani plaintiffs to redeposit their shares with the 
district court in the event the Anna Cingolani 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment 
and order of distribution on appeal, and there 
was no agreement by the Anna Cingolani 
plaintiffs to do the same if the Joan Cingolani 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the judgment 
and order of distribution in their appeal. With 
regard to the attorney fee claim, Anna and 
GWWB did not seek a stay of the September 
22, 1988, order distributing one-third of the 
Joan Cingolani plaintiffs' recovery to HLP. 
Instead, Anna .and GWWB acquiesced in the 
clerk's disbursement of the full contingent fee 
to HLP in accordance with Judge Harding's 
order and did not obtain any agreement from 
HLP to redeposit those funds with the district 
court if Anna prevailed in this court on the 
attorney fee distribution claim. 
As a result of these actions by the parties 
and Anna's counsel, the issues raised in both 
appeals are moot. There is no longer any set-
tlement money on deposit with the clerk of the 
district court, and there is no basis on which 
either the trial court or a party successful on 
appeal could compel the other party's return 
of the disbursed funds to the district court for 
redistribution. In short, even if we were to 
agree with one of the appellants on the settl-
ement distribution claim or with Anna and 
GWWB on the attorney fee distribution claim, 
we could not afford any relief to the succes-
sful appellant. See Black, 656 P.2d at 410. 
Appellants have not raised, and we do not 
perceive, any issues of public interest, see 
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1981), or any other extraordinary circumsta-
nces constituting an exception to the mootness 
doctrine, see Reynolds, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
33, that would justify our consideration of the 
merits of these moot appeals. We therefore 
dismiss both appeals, with the parties to bear 
their own costs. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
John Fair Larson, Judge 
1. John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. Although technically an appellee in both cases, 
Utah Power & Light Company is not an active 
participant in either appeal because the two groups 
of appellants are fighting with each other over the 
distribution of the settlement to which all appellants 
agreed. 
Cite as 
132 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Gregory MARSHALL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 890121-CA 
FILED: April 18, 1990 
Seventh District, Sevier County 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
ATTORNEYS: 
Jerold D. McPhee and Kristine K. Smith, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and 
Jackson. 
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal 
AMENDED OPINION* 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The appellant, Gregory J. Marshall ("Mr. 
Marshair), was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distri-
bute for value, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 
(1989). Mr. Marshall filed a pretrial motion to 
suppress the 140 pounds of marijuana seized 
from the rental car he was driving when he 
was arrested. The trial court denied Mr. 
Marshall's motion and he filed this interloc-
utory appeal. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
We recite the facts surrounding the seizure 
of the contraband in detail as the legal issues 
presented are fact sensitive. State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Utah 
Highway Patrol Trooper Denis Avery 
("Trooper Avery") was chiving on Interstate 
70 near Salina, Utah. He noticed Mr. Mars-
hall's vehicle in the left-hand lane passing a 
motor home. Trooper Avery observed that 
Mr. Marshall's turn signal remained blinking 
for approximately two miles after he passed 
the motor home. Not knowing whether Mr. 
Marshall's signal was malfunctioning or 
whether Mr. Marshall had negligently left the 
signal on, Trooper Avery pulled the vehicle 
over to inform Mr. Marshall of the problem 
and to give him a warning ticket. Trooper 
Avery had issued similar warning citations for 
turn signal violations approximately five to ten 
times in the previous six-month period. 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
Prior to stopping Mr. Marshall, Trooper 
Avery noticed the vehicle had California 
license plates. He approached Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle and informed Mr. Marshall of the turn 
signal problem. Mr. Marshall responded that 
he had been having "a hard time keeping the 
thing turned off." 
Trooper Avery asked Mr. Marshall for his 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Mr. 
Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for 
the vehicle. Mr. Marshall said he was going 
skiing in Denver and planned to return the car 
to San Diego, California. However, the rental 
agreement indicated that the car would be 
returned in New York in five days. 
Trooper Avery acknowledged he became 
suspicious that Mr. Marshall might be trans-
porting drugs. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall to return with him to his patrol car 
where he issued a warning citation for "Lights, 
head, tail, other." Trooper Avery then retu-
rned Mr. Marshall's driver's license and the 
rental agreement. 
Trooper Avery next asked Mr. Marshall if 
he was carrying alcohol, drugs or firearms. 
Mr. Marshall stated he was not. Trooper 
Avery then asked Mr. Marshall if he could 
"look inside the vehicle." Mr. Marshall resp-
onded, "Go ahead." Trooper Avery and Mr. 
Marshall walked back to Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle. The passenger door was locked'and 
Mr. Marshall reached in on the driver's side 
to open the door. Trooper Avery noticed a 
small red bag on the floor of the vehicle' and 
asked if he could open it. Mr. Marshall 
agreed. No contraband was found inside the 
bag or the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle. 
Trooper Avery then asked if Mr. Marshall 
had a key to the trunk and if Mr. Marshall 
would open the trunk. Mr. Marshall attempted 
to open the trunk, but was shaking so badly 
that Trooper Avery had to assist him by 
holding the key latch cover up while Mr. 
Marshall inserted the key. Trooper Avery saw 
four padlocked suitcases when Mr. Marshall 
opened the trunk. Trooper Avery asked Mr. 
Marshall what the suitcases contained and Mr. 
Marshall responded "clothes." Trooper'Avery 
then asked if he could look in the suitcases. 
Mr. Marshall immediately reversed his state-
ment and responded that the suitcases were 
not his and must have already been in the 
trunk when he rented the vehide. Trooper 
Avery testified there was some play in the 
zipper of one bag and he unzipped it far 
enough to see a green leafy substance. Trooper 
Avery then arrested Mr. Marshall for posses-
sion of a controlled substance. 
Mr. Marshall did not testify or present any 
evidence to contradict*Trooper Avery's testi-
mony during the hearing below. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]e will not disturb the trial court's 
factual evaluation underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless it is 
clearly erroneous.'' State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial court's 
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or if [the 
appellate courtj reachfes] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State 
v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) 
requires the trial court to state its findings on 
the record "[wjhere factual issues are involved 
in determining a motion." Those findings must 
be sufficiently detailed in order to allow us the 
opportunity to adequately review the decision 
below.1 
PRETEXT STOP 
Initially, Mr. Marshall contends Trooper 
Avery used the fact that his turn signal was 
malfunctioning as a pretext to stop his vehicle 
to search for evidence of drug trafficking. 
The protective shield of the fourth amend-
ment applies when an officer stops an auto-
mobile on the highway and detains its occup-
ants. State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). A police officer may constit-
utionally stop a dtizen on two alternative 
grounds. First, the stop "could be based on 
specific, articulable facts which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from those facts, 
would lead a reasonable person to conclude 
[defendant] had committed or was about to 
commit a crime." Id. (dting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. Christensen, 
676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984); State v. Tru-
jillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Second, the police officer can "stop an auto-
mobile for a traffic violation committed in the 
officer's presence." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. 
However, an officer may not use a traffic 
violation stop as a pretext to search for evid-
ence of a more serious crime. Id. 
To determine if Trooper Avery stopped Mr. 
Marshall's vehicle to investigate his hunch 
that Mr. Marshall's vehicle was involved in 
drug trafficking, we determine whether a 
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the 
totality of the circumstances confronting him 
or her, would have stopped Mr. Marshall to 
issue a warning for failing to terminate a turn 
signal. Id. at 978. 
Mr. Marshall claims Trooper Avery's stop 
ofJus vehide is similar to the stop we found 
unconstitutional In ~5/erra. "We disagree.^In 
Sierra, the basis articulated for the stop was 
that the driver remained in the left lane too 
long after passing a car. In this case, Trooper 
Avery perceived an equipment problem with 
Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn signal was 
malfunctioning or he had negligently failed to 
turn it off.2 Courts consistently have held that 
a police officer can stop a vehicle when he or 
she believes the vehicle's safety equipment is 
not functioning properly.3 
Furthermore, unlike the officer in Sierra, 
Trooper Avery was not suspicious of Mr. 
Marshall for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some 
reason to pull him over, and, before the 
alleged violation occurred, had not radioed for 
help thereby "indicating* ne intended to stop the 
vehicle. 
In conclusion, we find Trooper Avery's 
stop of Mr. Marshall's vehicle was not a 
pretext, but was a valid exercise of police 
authority to make certain Mr. Marshall's 
vehicle was functioning properly. 
UNREASONABLE DETENTION 
Next, Mr. Marshall complains that the 
extent of his detention and the scope of 
Trooper Avery's investigation exceeded con-
stitutional limits.4 
"[I]n determining whether the seizure and 
search were 'unreasonable' our inquiry is a 
dual one—whether the officer's action was 
justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumsta-
nces which justified the interference in the first 
place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 
(1968). 
We have previously found that Trooper 
Avery's traffic stop of Mr. Marshall was 
justified. The remaining question is whether 
Trooper Avery's subsequent detention and 
questioning of Mr. Marshall was reasonably 
related to the initial traffic stop or was justi-
fied because Trooper Avery had a reasonable 
suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was engaged 
in a more serious crime. United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir, 
1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has not 
chosen to define a bright-line rule as to the 
acceptable length of a detention because 
"common sense and ordinary human experi-
ence must govern over rigid criteria." United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). 
The Court has chosen to focus, not on the 
length of the detention alone, but on "whether 
the police diligently pursued a means of inve-
stigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it 
was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at 
686. 
Trooper Avery wrote out the warning cita-
tion within ten minutes of stopping Mr. 
Marshall and then returned Mr. Marshall's 
driver's license and the vehicle rental agree-
ment. Trooper Avery claims that as a result of 
his examination of Mr. Marshall's driver's 
license and the vehicle rental agreement and 
his brief conversation with Mr. Marshall, he 
became suspicious that Mr. Marshall was 
involved in drug trafficking. Specifically, 
Trooper Avery points to the fact that Mr. 
Marshall produced a New York driver's 
license and a California rental agreement for 
the vehicle. When questioned about the rental 
agreement, Mr. Marshall said he was going 
skiing in Colorado and planned to return the 
car to San Diego, California. However, the 
rental agreement indicated the car was to be 
returned to New York in five days, the appr-
oximate time it takes to drive directly from 
California to New York. In addition,' Mr. 
Marshall was driving along a well-known 
drug trafficking route. 
As a result of his suspicion, Trooper Avery 
then asked Mr. Marshall if he was carrying 
weapons, alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Mr. 
Marshall responded he was not. Then Trooper 
Avery allegedly asked for permission to look 
into the vehicle and received Mr. Marshall's 
consent. 
The trial judge found that Trooper Avery's 
"investigation was reasonable in view of the 
defendant's statements in regards to the 
vehicle ownership and the driver's usage. The 
destination itinerary would have put a reaso-
nable officer on notice that something was 
wrong." Although not directly so stating, the 
judge, in substance, concluded that Trooper 
Avery had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
Mr. Marshall was involved in illegal conduct. 
Although it is a close call, we agree with the 
trial court's assessment of the reasonableness 
of the detention. 
We find that Trooper Avery's questioning 
of Mr. Marshall as to conduct unrelated to the 
traffic stop was justified because he had rea-
sonable suspicion to believe Mr. Marshall was 
engaged in a more serious crime. See Guzman, 
864F.2datl519. 
In conclusion, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, we agree with the trial court 
that Trooper Avery's ten-minute detention 
and brief questioning of Mr. Marshall prior to 
Mr. Marshall's alleged consent to search the 
vehicle was not an unreasonable detention. 
SEARCH 
On appeal, Mr. Marshall argues that even if 
his initial stop and subsequent detention were 
not constitutionally deficient, the subsequent 
search of the trunk of the vehicle and the 
suitcases found in the trunk without a warrant 
violated his fourth amendment rights. The 
state contends, on the other hand, that Mr. 
Marshall consented to the search of the trunk 
and abandoned any privacy interest in the 
suitcases and thus Trooper Avery's search of 
the suitcases was constitutionally permissible.5 
In our prior opinion, we focused solely on 
whether the search of the suitcases was proper. 
We found the warrantless search of the suitc-
ases unconstitutional as we refused to allow 
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the state to raise the issue of fourth amend-
ment standing for the first time on appeal. We 
granted the state's petition for rehearing to re-
examine the related fourth amendment issues 
of voluntary consent and abandonment which 
are central to a resolution of this appeal. 
1. Standing 
The state, in its original brief on appeal, 
claimed Mr. Marshall was without standing to 
challenge the seizure of the suitcases as he had 
disclaimed any ownership or possessory inte-
rest in the suitcases during the search and thus 
had no expectation of privacy in their cont-
ents. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-
50 (1978); State v. Valdcz, 689 P.2d 1334, 
1335 (Utah 1984); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 
70, 73-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). The state relies upon the following 
testimony from the preliminary hearing: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] And what 
was inside the trunk? 
A. [Trooper Avery] There were 
four suitcases. 
Q. Did you ask if you could look 
in those suitcases? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). First of 
all, I asked him what was in the 
suitcases, and he told me, right 
quickly, clothes. Then when I 
looked at him again, he told me 
that he didn't know where they 
came from, they must have been in 
there when he rented the car. 
In our prior opinion, we relied on the Utah 
Supreme Court decision of State v. Schlosser, 
11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), which squarely 
held that standing to challenge the validity of 
a search under the fourth amendment "is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine [but] is a substantive 
doctrine that identifies those who may assert 
rights against unlawful searches and seizures." 
Id. at 1138. Citing the general rule that a 
substantive issue or "claim of error cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal," the 
supreme court deemed the issue of standing 
waived. Id. at 1138-39. 
The state attempts to distinguish Schlosser, 
claiming that in that case the state not only 
failed to raise the issue of standing in the 
motion to suppress hearing, but also on appeal 
and that here, unlike Schlosser, the state raises 
standing simply as an alternative ground to 
uphold the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress.6 We do not find the distinction 
determinative.7 
< The United States Supreme Court took the 
same position in Steagald v. United States, 451 
U.S. 204 (1981), when it refused to allow the 
government to raise the issue of fourth ame-
ndment standing for the first time on appeal 
to provide an alternative ground to sustain the 
trial court's , refusal <to grant a motion to 
suppress. The Court concluded: 
Aside from arguing that a search 
warrant was not constitutionally 
required, the Government was ini-
tially entitled to defend against 
petitioner's charge of an unlawful 
search by asserting that petitioner 
lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the searched home, or 
that he consented to the search, or 
that exigent circumstances justified 
the entry. The Government, 
however, may lose its right to raise 
factual issues of this sort before this 
Court when it has made contrary 
assertions in the courts below, when 
it has acquiesced in contrary find-
ings by those courts, or when it has 
failed to raise such questions in a 
timely fashion during the litigation. 
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
The state, on petition for rehearing, cont-
ends that language in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128 (1978) is contrary to our conclusion 
that the state should not be allowed to raise 
standing for the first time on appeal. We dis-
agree. The language in Rakas relied upon by 
the state is consistent with our view. 
The proponent of a motion to 
suppress has the burden of establi-
shing that his own Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated by the 
challenged search or seizure. The pro-
secutor argued that petitioners 
lacked standing to challenge the 
search because they did not own the 
rifle, the shells or the automobile. Peti-
tioners did not contest the 
factual predicates of the prosec-
utor's argument and instead, simply 
stated that they were not required 
to prove ownership to object to the 
search. - The prosecutor's argument 
gave - petitioners notice that they 
were to be put to their proof on any 
issue as to which they had the 
burden, and because of their failure 
to assert ownership, we must 
assume, for purposes of our review, 
that petitioners do not own the rifle 
or the shells. 
Id. at 130 n.l (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
We agree Avith the state and Rakas that Mr. 
Marshall has the ultimate burden of proof to 
establish that his fourth amendment rights 
were violated or, to put it otherwise, that he 
had an expectation of privacy in the area 
searched or the articles seized.9 Nevertheless, 
warrantless' searches are per se unreasonable 
and the burden is on the state, in the first 
instance, to show that a warrantless search is 
lawful. State v. Opistcnsen, 676 P.2d 408; 411 
(Utah 1984). 
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We believe Rakas is consistent with our view 
that the prosecutor, as part of the state's 
burden to establish the constitutionality of a 
warrantless search, must give a defendant 
"notice that he will be put to his proof" on the 
issue of fourth amendment standing. This can 
be done at any time during the hearing on a 
defendant's motion to suppress as long as the 
defendant has an opportunity to put on evid-
ence to meet the claim.9 Once the defendant 
has been put on notice that the state claims 
the warrantless search was constitutional 
because he has no expectation of privacy in 
the area searched, then the defendant must 
factually demonstrate that he does have stan-
ding to contest the warrantless search. We 
believe the Schlosser standing rule was fashi-
oned to protect the defendant from being 
required to deal with new legal issues on 
appeal when he had no warning of the neces-
sity to develop the relevant facts below. 
2. Consent/Abandonment 
The state, on petition for rehearing, excuses 
its failure to raise the issue of standing clai-
ming that neither Mr. Marshall, the state nor 
the trial judge focused on the search of the 
suitcases in the motion to suppress hearing. 
Rather, the state claims the hearing centered 
on the pretextual nature of the stop, the unr-
easonable detention of Mr. Marshall and the 
unlawful search of the trunk. 
Mr. Marshall, on petition for rehearing, 
claims the following comment made by 
defense counsel sufficiently focused the proc-
eeding on the search of the suitcases: 
"Additionally there is no evidence that there 
was consent to search the bags." 
Upon a re-examination of the record, we 
agree with the state that the parties and the 
trial judge did not focus on the critical issue 
of the search of the suitcases at the motion to 
suppress hearing. The result is that the trial 
judge did not make adequate findings of fact 
on the issues of voluntary consent to search 
the trunk or the suitcases and Mr. Marshall's 
alleged abandonment of any privacy interest in 
the suitcases, which the parties now agree are 
pivotal on appeal. We therefore remand for a 
rehearing on these critical issues. We nevert-
heless discuss the controlling law to guide the 
trial court on rehearing. 
A search is valid under the fourth amend-
ment if it is conducted as a result of the def-
endant's voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). *[T]he question [of] whether a consent 
to a search was in fact Voluntary* or was the 
product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied, is a question of fact to be determined 
from the totality of all the circumstances/ 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. "A trial court's 
finding of voluntary consent will not be reve-
rsed unless it is clearly erroneous/ United 
States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 
1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979). 
In United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 
(10th Cir. 1977), the Tenth Circuit outlined 
the specifics necessary for the government to 
sustain its burden to show that voluntary 
consent was given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and 
"freely and intelligently given"; (2) 
the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coer-
cion, express or implied; and (3) the 
courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evid-
ence that such rights were waived. 
Id. at 885 (quoting Villano v. United States, 
310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962)). See also 
United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453 
(10th Cir. 1985). See generally State v. Whit-
tenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); State 
v. Sierra, ISA P.2d 972, 980-81 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Even when a defendant voluntarily consents 
to a search, the ensuing search must be limited 
in scope to only the specific area agreed to by 
defendant. "The scope of a consent search is 
limited by the breadth of the actual consent 
itself .... Any police activity that transcends 
the actual scope of the consent given encroa-
ches on the Fourth Amendment rights of the 
suspect." Umted States v. Gay, 11A F.2d 368, 
377 (10th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., People v. 
Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 201 (Colo. 1984) (scope 
of consent exceeded when police asked to 
"look around" the house, then conducted a 45-
minute search of rooms, drawers, boxes and 
closed containers). 
The trial court made the following conclu-
sory finding on the issue of Mr. Marshall's 
consent: "The Defendant consented to the 
search. There was no evidence of duress or 
coercion." This conclusory finding on consent 
is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether Mr. Marshall's consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" as it does not detail 
what Mr. Marshall agreed could be searched— 
the interior of the passenger compartment, the 
trunk, or the locked suitcases.10 Furthermore, 
the relevant portions from the transcript of 
Trooper Avery's testimony are troubling: 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What were 
the words he [sic] used when you 
asked him to search his vehicle? 
A. [Trooper Avery] I asked Mr. 
Marshall if-if there were any-
if there was any-were there any 
drugs in the vehicle, and he took 
two or three seconds-no, wait a 
minute, I guess-I first asked him 
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if he was carrying any weapons and 
he told me no. I then asked him if 
he was carrying any~if there was 
any alcohol in the vehicle, he said 
that he did not drink. I recall both 
answers were quite quick. And then 
I asked him if there were any drugs 
in the vehicle, he paused for, you 
know, probably two or three 
seconds, and then told me no. I 
then asked him if it would be okay 
if I looked in the vehicle, search the 
vehicle, an^he said go ahead. 
Q. Now, aid you ask if you could 
look in the vehicle, or did you ask 
if you could search the vehicle? 
A. Well, according to this [his 
report], I said-I asked if I could 
look in the vehicle. 
Q. So, it was "look in the vehicle"? 
You didn't ask if you could open 
anything inside the vehicle or any-
thing else, did you? 
A. No. I just asked if I could look 
in the vehicle. 
Q. And what happened then? 
A. Mr. Marshall just told me, you 
know, he said go right ahead. He 
got out, gathered up his papers and 
we walked up to the front of the 
vehicle, and he had to open the 
passenger door, as I recall. 
Q. And how did you get in the 
trunk? 
A. I asked him, I said-asked 
him if he had the key to the trunk 
and he says yes, and I says-and 
I asked him if he'[d] open it, which 
he did, he tried. He was extremely 
nervous at the time. I -
Q. So did you open the trunk? 
A. No, sir, I did not. He-he 
could not-there was a little latch 
over the key hole. He was shaking 
so hard, he couldn't even hold the 
latch open, so I held the latch up 
for him so he could insert the key. 
Without the assistance of specific findings 
of fact, we cannot resolve the difficult issue of 
whether , Mr. Marshall's opening the trunk 
constituted implied consent to search the trunk 
under the totality of the circumstances prese-
nted. See United States v. Almand, 565 F.2d 
927, 930 (5th Or.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. S24 
(1978) (voluntary consent found where defe-
ndant silently reached into his pocket, 
removed key, then unlocked and opened 
camper door). 
Furthermore, the record creates a substan-
tial question as to whether the court's general 
finding that there was "no evidence of duress 
or coercion" was intended to apply to the 
search of the trunk or, even if it was, whether 
the finding is consistent with the standard 
required for a voluntary consent. See United 
States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 
1977); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 980-81 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Likewise, the court in 
its findings fails to focus on the search of the 
locked suitcases and the issues of voluntary 
consent or abandonment. 
Even if we were to accept the state's argu-
ment that the undisputed facts support a 
finding that Mr. Marshall abandoned11 any 
expectation of privacy in the suitcases by his 
ambiguous disclaimer of ownership and that 
the state should be allowed to raise this fourth 
amendment standing issue for the first time on 
appeal, we would be unable to dispose of this 
case on the record before us. The state, in its 
petition for rehearing, correctly points out that 
"a loss of standing to challenge a search 
cannot be brought about by illegal police 
conduct." United States v. Labat, 696 F. 
Supp. 1419,1425 (D. Kan. 1988). 
Thus, we would have to determine if the 
search of the trunk was illegal or was a result 
of a voluntary consent. This we cannot do on 
the record before us. 
Even if we determined the search of the 
trunk was unlawful, the "defendant must show 
a nexus between the allegedly unlawful police 
conduct and the abandonment of the prop-
erty." Id. at 1426. See, e.g., United States v. 
Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041 (6th Or. 1982), cert, 
denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983) (While *an unc-
onstitutional seizure or arrest which prompts a 
disclaimer of property vitiates that act," id. at 
1045, the court found the defendant's discla-
imer was not precipitated by improper 
conduct. Id. at 1048.); United States v. 
Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 620 (9th Or. 1982) 
("There must be a nexus between the allegedly 
unlawful police conduct and abandonment of 
property if the challenged evidence is to be 
suppressed."); United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 
726, 730 (5th Cir. 1979) (if there is a nexus 
between unlawful police conduct and the dis-
covery of evidence, the court should suppress 
the evidence). See generally Search and 
Seizure: What Constitutes Abandonment of 
Personal Property within Rule that Search and 
Seizure of Abandoned Property Is Not Unre-
asonable-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381 
(1985). Again, there is no. finding on this 
crucial issue. 
Therefore, we reverse and remand this int-
erlocutory appeal for a rehearing on Mr. 
Marshall's motion to suppress on the limited 
issues of whether Mr. Marshall voluntarily 
consented to the search of the trunk or the 
suitcases, whether Mr. Marshall abandoned 
any privacy interest in the suitcases and thus 
lacks standing to challenge their search, and 
finally, if the trial .court finds there Jwas an 
illegal search **©f ?the trunk. lor suitcases, 
whether there is & sufficient nexus'between 
that illegal search'and Mr. Marshall's aban-
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donment , if any, of his expectation of privacy 
in the suitcases. 
Judi th M. Billings, Judge 
W E C O N C U R : 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norman H . Jackson, Judge 
•This opinion issued on Petition for Rehearing 
replaces the opinion of the same name issued 
on December 26, 1989. 
1. Utah appellate courts have consistently required 
detailed findings of fact to support a judgment 
entered by a trial judge in civil cases, ^cker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) ("The 
importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential 
to the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of 
law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to dis-
close the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached."); Sampson v. 
Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (findings of fact must indicate the "mind of 
the court." (quoting Parks v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 673 P.2d 590,601 (Utah 1983)). 
Detailed findings of fact likewise greatly ease the 
burden of an appellate court in its review of a trial 
court's decision on a motion to suppress. This is 
particularly true where multiple issue are presented 
in the motion to suppress. 4 W. LaFave, Search & 
Seizure §11.2, at 252 (1987) [hereinafter "LaFave"! 
(citing State v. Johnson, 16 Or. App. 560, 519 P.2d 
1053, 1058-59 (1974)). Many jurisdictions require 
specific findings of fact on all motions to suppress. 
See LaFave at §11.2 n.188. We believe the requir-
ement a sound one. 
2. While the warning citation does not specify which 
provision of the Utah Code Mr. Marshall violated, 
the state asserts that his conduct was in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-117(1) (1988) which, 
with our emphasis, provides: 
It is a misdemeanor for any person to 
drive or move or for the owner to cause 
or knowingly permit to be driven or 
moved on any highway any vehicle or 
combination of vehicles which is in such 
unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person, or which does not contain those 
parts or is not at all times equipped with 
lamps and other equipment in proper 
condition and adjustment.... 
3. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660-61 
(1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that 
an officer has a duty in the interest of highway 
safety to stop vehicles for safety reasons. "Many 
violations of minimum vehicle-safety requirements 
are observable, and something can be done about 
them by the observing officer, directly and immed-
iately." Id. at 660. The Court inferred that as long 
as an officer suspects the driver is violating "any 
one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equi-
pment regulations," the police officer may legally 
stop the vehicle. Id. at 661. See Townsel v. State, 
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (court 
held stop justified when vehicle's headlight was out, 
a tail light was broken, the license plate and 
windows were obscured, and speeding); State v. 
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201, 202 (1975) 
(suspicion of defective turn signals justified stop); 
State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224 (Me. 1989) (stop 
justified when blinking headlights led officer to stop 
vehicle for safety reasons). 
4. We do not analyze this issue under article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution as the state 
constitutional issue was not sufficiently particular-
ized below nor is a reasoned analysis provided on 
appeal as to why our analysis should be different 
under Utah's constitution. See State v. Johnson, 
111 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
5. The state does not argue that Trooper Avery had 
probable cause to search either the car or the suitc-
ases. We, therefore, need not deal with the troubl-
esome issue of whether probable cause to search an 
automobile is sufficient under the automobile exce-
ption to search a locked suitcase found in the trunk 
of a car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798 (1982) (if probable cause exists, police can 
search closed containers found in vehicle); Arkansas 
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search 
of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi invalid); 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 
(warrantless search of a footlocker found in the 
trunk of a vehicle invalid); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 272 n.l (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring separately) (criticizing the Ross holding). 
6. Prior to Schlosser, the Utah Supreme Court had, 
in several cases, considered standing for the first 
time on appeal and had utilized the doctrine to 
refuse to consider the constitutional validity of a 
challenged search. See, e.g., State v. Constantino, 
732 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) 
(court did not address whether the issue of standing 
had been raised below, but stated that defendant 
could not assert any expectation of privacy in 
vehicle because he did not own vehicle and had 
presented no testimony that he had permission of 
owner or had borrowed vehicle "under circumsta-
nces that would imply permissive use"); State v. 
Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1986) (State 
below argued there was consent by defendant's ex-
wife to search his mother's trailer. On appeal, the 
state argued defendant had no possessory or prop-
rietary interest in the trailer and thus had no expe-
ctation of privacy. The court declined to reach the 
issue of consent because it found that defendant 
lacked standing to object to the search because the 
stipulated evidence did not show that defendant 
shared ownership, use or possession of the trailer.); 
State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) 
(At trial, the defendant produced evidence that 
neither the attache case in which the evidence was 
found nor the vehicle belonged to the defendant. 
The court did not address whether the issue of sta-
nding was raised below, but declined to reach the 
question of the validity of the search because the 
defendant conceded he did not own the case or the 
vehicle and had failed to show any expectation of 
privacy.). In these earlier cases, it is sometimes 
unclear whether the Utah Supreme Court raised the 
issue of standing sua sponte on appeal or permitted 
the state to raise the issue of standing for the first 
time on appeal. We assume that Schlosser superc-
edes these earlier cases and thus do not follow them. 
7. Although the Utah Supreme Court refused to 
allow standing to be utilized to attack the trial 
court's granting of a motion to suppress in Schlo-
sser, the court relied on State v. Goodman, 42 
Wash. App. 331, 711 P.2d 1057 (1985), which held 
the state could not raise the issue of standing for the 
first time on appeal to provide an alternative ground 
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for sustaining the trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress. Id. at 1060. 
8. However, the failure of the state to challenge Mr. 
Marshall's standing at the suppression hearing did 
not give Mr. Marshall an opportunity to assert his 
expectation of privacy. See Combs v. United States, 
408 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1972) (per curiam) (Where 
petitioner's failure to assert an expectation of 
privacy may have been explained by the Govern-
ment's failure to challenge standing either at the 
suppression hearing or at trial, the United States 
Supreme Court remanded to the district court for 
further proceedings to allow petitioner to establish a 
privacy interest.). 
9. The defendant's testimony at the motion to 
suppress hearing cannot be used against the defen-
dant at trial. See Simmons v. United States, 390 
U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (prosecutor cannot use a def-
endant's testimony at a suppression hearing as 
substantive evidence of guilt at trial unless defen-
dant makes no objection). We note, however, that 
the United States Supreme Court had not decided 
whether the Simmons rule precludes the use of a 
defendant's suppression hearing testimony to 
impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See 
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 94 & n.9 
(1980). 
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the importance of detailed findings on 
a motion to suppress. 
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 
1173 (10th Cir. 1983) (Court found abandonment 
when police initially saw defendant running with a 
brown satchel, however, when they captured defe-
ndant, he did not have the satchel and disavowed 
knowledge of it. Police later found the satchel 
outside the building and searched it.); United States 
v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 202 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982) (court found abandon-
ment where the defendant, after picking up the 
luggage at the claim area, produced a mismatched 
baggage claim check, told agents that his name was 
not on the luggage name tag, and allowed the agents 
to return the luggage to the claim area, thus giving 
the agents the impression that he had no interest in 
the luggage); United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 
1217, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 
U.S. 946 (1982) (court found abandonment where 
the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet 
found on the seat of the vehicle); United States v. 
Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) 
(court found abandonment when defendants discl-
aimed ownership of suitcases and began to walk 
away from them). 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiffs/appellants Carl N. Smith and 
Dawna LaVerne Smith ("Smiths*) appeal from 
a money judgment in their favor. The Smiths 
claim the trial court incorrectly assessed the 
damages due them as a result of the defendant/ 
appellee Linmar Energy Corporation's 
("Linmar Energy") placement of an oil well, 
battery storage tank, and road on the Smiths' 
property pursuant to an oil and gas lease. We 
affirm. 
The Smiths are owners of a fee interest in 
20 acres of land located adjacent to the city 
limits of Altamont in Duchesne County. 
Linmar Energy is the lessee under an oil and 
gas lease covering this property. The Smiths' 
20-acre tract, including the land now occu-
pied by the well site, has been used exclusively 
for agricultural purposes. The Smiths' prop-
erty is located in the Altamont-Bluebell oil 
field and is surrounded by numerous oil wells, 
some of which may be seen from the Smith 
property. 
In 1983,' Linmar 'Energy, pursuant to its 
lease, entered onto the southwest corner of the 
Smiths' 20-acre parcel to install an oil well 
along with an oil well battery and storage 
tanks. Linmar Energy also constructed an 
access road from the .county road on the north 
to the well site. Linmar Energy occupied 4.76 
acres of the 20-acre parcel. 
Linmar Energy,, considered several other 
alternative locations for the well site, but rej-
ected the other sites based on geological "and 
economic factors. Prior to construction of the 
well site, Linmar Energy^ representative 
contacted Carl Smith and inet him on the 
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